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Interpreting Insurance Policies
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL
Like any other contract, an insurance policy
may become the subject of a legal dispute. When
disputes arise over insurance coverage, lawyers
must combine their skill in contract interpretation
with their knowledge of insurance law, bringing
both to bear on the special problems related to
this type of contract. Each dispute has unique
traits, but a few basic ground rules of contract law
and insurance law can help you interpret insur-
ance policies and resolve disputes over insurance
coverage.
Applying the Basics: Contract Law
Virtually any court begins with the principle
that insurance policies are contracts and subject
to the ordinary rules of contract interpretation.'
To deal with the occasional coverage dispute, you
can go a long way simply by remembering and
intelligently applying the standard rules of con-
tract construction:
The existence of an enforceable contract requires
an offer, acceptance, and consideration.' Don't
overlook this principle, even if it seems obvious. It
can be a defense for insurers in cases where the
policyholder failed to pay a first premium (consid-
eration) or let premiums lapse. Occasionally, detri-
mental reliance can provide the necessary consid-
eration.: Similarly, there must be evidence that
the policyholder actually took out a policy and
that the insurer actually issued a policy.4
The courts will not enforce illegal contracts.5 If
an insurance policy does not conform to the
requirements of the state insurance department,
it may not be enforceable or may be construed
against the insurer in close cases. Nor may insur-
ance be obtained as a form of "wagering" or moral
Jeffrey W. Stempel is a professor of law at Florida
State College of Law in Tallahassee, Florida and
author of Interpretation of Insurance Contracts-
Law and Strategy for Insurers and Policyholders
(1994), published by Little, Brown & Co., Boston.
hazard-the requirement behind the insurable
interest doctrine, which requires the policyholder
to have a concrete interest in the subject of the
insurance.6 The insurable interest doctrine occa-
sionally makes the news in cases of killings where
the motive was to collect insurance proceeds.
(Remember the old movie Double Indemnity?)
Some nefarious
people have engaged
in murder for
insurance profits,
even when the policy
covers a relative
However, some nefarious people have engaged in
murder for insurance profits, even when the policy
covers a relative or business partner.7
The text of a contract (that is, the insurance pol-
icy) will ordinarily determine the meaning of the
contract.' The courts are reluctant to interpret the
meaning further unless the words are ambiguous
or clearly contradicted by other evidence of the
intended meaning.'
The law attempts to enforce contracts to fulfill
their intended purpose and the intent of the par-
ties.' The contract is to be read as a whole, giving
effect to all provisions if' possible."
If a contract term is clear enough, a court may
refuse to hear oral testimony or other extrinsic evi-
dence intended to contradict the meaning of the
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contract's text.12 This is the venerable parol evi-
dence rule. It has lost some force over the years
but still retains bite, especially if the contract
itself purports to be an integrated and complete
agreement that excludes parol evidence. However,
if contract text is ambiguous, courts permit oral
testimony and other extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret, explain, or amplify a term." Even if the term
is not particularly vague or ambiguous, some
courts will receive extrinsic evidence to further
explain or refine it, so long as the extrinsic matter
does not contradict the text. "
Contracts of adhesion are enforceable but may
offer the adhering party protections unavailable
with a contract custom-made for both parties. ",
Contracts of adhesion (which include many insur-
ance contracts) are contracts offered on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis; the other party must adhere to
the offered contract if there is to be a deal. Unless
Contracts of adhesion
are offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it
basis: Adhere
to the contract
or no deal
the text of an adhesion contract is very clear, the
adhering party may be protected by other contract
ground rules and judges' wariness of unfair
enforcement.
Even if the contract is custom-made, the rule of
contra proferentem applies. According to this rule,
ambiguities are construed against the author of
the contract. In other words, any unclear word or
phrase is interpreted to the detriment of the
drafter unless the uncertainty is readily resolv-
able by a more reliable basis than the contra pro-
ferentem rule.'6
Contracts procured through fraud or deceit are
unenforceable or may be rescinded or (in rarer
cases) modified to prevent unfairness. " This prin-
ciple of contract law works both ways in insurance
disputes. Insurers cannot expect premiums for
policies sold through high-pressure tactics and
cannot avoid their obligations by fraudulently
obtaining agreement to exclusions. Conversely,
policyholders cannot obtain coverage by using
misrepresentations to procure the policy or by
making a fraudulent claim."8 In many cases, if a
policyholder grossly inflates an otherwise legiti-
mate claim, he or she can lose all coverage. 9
Contract terms that violate applicable public
policy are unenforceable."0 Therefore, even if the
text of an insurance policy is clear, coverage will
not be provided if doing so would offend public
policy or undermine the way in which insurance
operates."' Perhaps the leading example concerns
whether policyholders may receive indemnity for
punitive damages they have been ordered to pay.2"
The states are split, 3 with some holding that
insuring punitive damages encourages or subsi-
dizes wrongful conduct,2' while others see puni-
tive damages as simply another form of liability
occasionally faced by defendants.2" Some states
permit indemnity for punitive damages that
result from vicarious liability or recklessness or
gross negligence but not for punitive damages
arising from intentional conduct.26
Insurance Policies vs. Other Contracts
Because the basic principles of contracts are
relevant to insurance policies in so many ways,
courts often state that insurance policies are "just
like any other contract" for purposes of adjudicat-
ing disputes. Despite the frequency of such state-
ments, they are not entirely true.
Contracting. To begin with, insurance policies
are usually made differently than other
contracts. '7 Most contracts occur at the point of
transaction: phoning a broker and arranging to
sell wheat; buying a sweater at the clothing store;
ordering books by mail; discussing and accepting
a job offer. In these situations, the contract may
not be written or detailed, but it is final and
agreed to by the parties in unison. By contrast,
most insurance involves discussion and applica-
tion, with the insurer processing the application
through its underwriting department and making
the decision to contract weeks or months later.
Thus, the contract is usually "formed" only when
the insurer says so.
An important variant to this scenario involves
the sale of life insurance. Applicants for life insur-
ance are typically given a "conditional receipt"
that establishes coverage as of the date of the
application, provided certain conditions are met or
the policy is eventually issued. The terms of condi-
tional receipts vary, and the courts have differed
considerably in their enforcement for or against
the insurers that use them. If an applicant for life
insurance pays the first premium, obtains a condi-
tional receipt, and dies betbre a policy is issued,
predicting the outcome of the litigation is complex
and depends on a variety of factors peculiar to
this corner of insurance law."
Property insurers often issue "binders" estab-
lishing temporary coverage until they issue a full
policy. The binder typically comes closer to a pure
commitment of temporary insurance than does a
conditional receipt, because the local agent can
inspect the property in question. Evaluating a life
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or health insurance risk generally requires med-
ical tests, and the underwriting generally occurs
in the insurer's home office.
Adhesion. When an insurance policy is issued
and delivered, the policyholder may never have
seen (let alone read) it. Even for those who read
every word, a policy is For most consumers and
small businesses a standardized form contract of
adhesion.2 1 This general contracting scenario usu-
ally makes courts hesitant to enforce insurance
policy terms that may be unfair or surprising as
applied to the consumer policyholder. In contrast,
if the policyholder insisted on and obtained cus-
tomized language or is a commercially sophisticat-
ed entity, courts are less apt to base decisions on
the nature of insurance contracting and standard-
ized forms and more likely to use the principles
they apply to standard contract controversies.
However, the sophistication of both parties may be
relevant to applying the "reasonable expectations"
doctrine discussed below.: '
Ambiguity. Because insurance policies are stan-
dardized, the contra proferentem doctrine is some-
times referred to as the "contra insurer" doctrine.
However, insurance companies do not always lose
linguistic battles. On the contrary, they win at
least their fair share because they are profession-
als with vast experience in using (or at least try-
ing to use) "airtight" language that will define cov-
ered claims firmly, if not always clearly.
In determining whether a term is ambiguous,
courts usually give words their ordinary rather
than technical meaning unless the parties' prior
course of dealing or custom in the industry calls
for application of a technical term.)" Dictionary
definitions are not determinative unless they
square with common usage. As one court
remarked, "By their very nature, dictionaries
define words in the abstract [rather thani in the
context of a specific insurance policy.'
'32
In addition, courts will not invoke the ambiguity
doctrine in order to provide coverage in bizarre sit-
uations obviously outside the intent or expectations
of the parties or where the coverage sought would
undermine the effective operation of the insurance
markets or otherwise run afoul of public policy.""
For example, a court would not permit an arsonist
to recover under a homeowner's policy even if the
insurer had omitted an exclusion for arson or other
intentional destruction of the property."
Overail, then, courts approach disputes over
insurance coverage as a subset of contract
jurisprudence, but they are sensitive to the special
nature of the insurance-contracting regime.
Therefore, they give greater than average weight
to contract doctrines wary of adhesion contracts
and favorable to contra proferentern construction.
In particular, states tend to be of three types
regarding their enthusiasm for tim contra profer-
entern doctrine. Some states seize upon virtually
any uncertainty to construe the policy in favor of
the policyholder.:" At the other extreme are states
that invoke the ambiguity principle only as a last
resort or even occasionally disavow the doctrine as
too crude a tool for carving meaning from insur-
ance policies." The plurality of states take a mid-
die ground, using ambiguity analysis as a
tiebreaker when extrinsic evidence of meaning,
party intent, functional analysis of the transac-
tion, or other indicia have failed to determine cov-
erage clearly.:7
Traditionally,
the policyholder
bears the burden
to show that a
loss falls within
the agreement
Assigning and Shifting Burdens of Proof The
burden of proof in coverage disputes can vary
according to the policy provision at issue, although
courts themselves seem to vary according to how
closely they observe these axioms. According to
the traditional ground rule, the policyholder bears
the burden to show that a particular loss falls
within the terms of the insuring agreement."8
Normally, this is relatively easy, because modern
insurance policies are broadly writtn. After the
insuring agreement in most policies come a set of
conditions that the policyholder must fulfill to
obtain coverage. Some are the so-called "condi-
tions precedent" that must generally be fulfilled
before the insurer has any obligation to defend or
indemnify."" Conditions subsequent are events
which, should they occur, terminate a contract
obligation.'
Also included in policies are lists of exclu-
sions-items or events excluded from the broad
coverage of the insuring agreement. If the policy-
holder has shown that a claim falls generally
within the policy, the insurer has the burden of
proof to demonstrate that the exclusion applies."
Sometimes qualifications or exceptions are
embedded into exclusions. If so, the burden to
show whether the exception negates the exclusion
may be assigned in various ways. Most states
assign this burden to the insurer as part of its
responsibility to demonstrate the applicability of
an exclusion if it is to avoid coverage.'
In a nutshell, the policyholder bears the burden
to prove the applicability of a coverage clause, and
Summer 1995
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the insurer has the burden to prove the germane-
ness of an exclusionary clause, regardless of the
labels attached in the policy.'
Burden shifting can be important in close
cases, but it seldom is determinative: Courts see a
claim as either subject to an exclusion or outside
it, no matter how the burden of proof has been
assigned. Consequently, if you are arguing for cov-
If you are
arguing for
coverage, do not
depend on the
assignment of
the burden
erage, do not depend much on the assignment of
the burden.
Notice. Burden shifting may have an impact
regarding particular aspects of an insurance dis-
pute, however. For example, insurance policies
require the policyholder to provide timely notice of
a claim to the insurer so that it may respond
through investigation, defense, third-party claims,
or other appropriate means. The insurer can
defeat coverage if notice is late.44
However, to prevail on this defense in the
majority of states, the insurer must not only show
that notice was late but also that it was preju-
diced by the tardiness.4" Unless the insurer can
show that a key witness died, a key document was
lost, property in controversy was irrevocably
altered, or something similar occurred during the
delay, this will be a virtually impossible burden.'6
Hence, assignment of the burden to prove preju-
dice often is determinative. A few states place the
burden on the policyholder to prove lack of preju-
dice.47 But in about a dozen states (including New
York), the insurer need only prove lateness.4
Seeking Reasonableness
Courts are also affected by a desire to make the
insurance relationship work as it should. In theo-
ry at least, this notion is even-handed. (Policyhold-
ers should not pay premiums in vain, and insurers
should not be fleeced by slippery policyholders.) In
practice, the desire to give effect to a policy some-
times merges with ambiguity analysis to favor
policy construction that finds or enhances cover-
age. For example, some courts state that when two
equally plausible interpretations of a disputed
provision exist, the interpretation permitting
greater indemnity will prevail."' Policyholders
should get the coverage to which a reasonable per-
son would be entitled under the circumstances,
while insurers should not pay for losses outside
the reasonably intended scope of the policy.
Courts construed policies this way for years
before the tendency was formally named (by
Robert Keeton in his famous law review article"0 )
the "reasonable expectations" doctrine. Under the
classic Keeton formula, a loss will be covered
where coverage is consistent with the policyhold-
er's objectively reasonable expectations, even if a
painstaking study of the insurance policy would
negate those expectations. In other words, insur-
ance companies may obtain the benefit of the poli-
cy's fine-print boilerplate but only if those cover-
age terms and limits are reasonable.
Although the reasonable expectations doctrine
has been officially embraced in only about half the
states and has been expressly rejected or criti-
cized in about a dozen,' this type of analysis often
silently affects coverage disputes. Courts inter-
preting policy language, assigning persuasion bur-
dens, dealing with adhesion and ambiguity, and
assessing the fairness of a contract term are often
influenced by whether a given result is more con-
sistent with the objectively reasonable expecta-
tions of the litigants. 2
The key words are "objectively reasonable."
Subjective, idiosyncratic, and bizarre expectations
will not provide coverage. For example, an auto-
mobile policyholder who knowingly uses a car to
carry and detonate a terrorist bomb will have a
hard time collecting comprehensive coverage for
the loss of the car after the bomb detonates.
This doctrine recognizes that expectations can
vary between policyholder and insurer. Just as in
general contract law a unilateral mistake will not
make a contract voidable (although a mutual mis-
take will), the court will not nullify a policy where
views differ. Rather, it must decide which party's
expectation is more reasonable. These cases are
often difficult and unpredictable. On one hand, the
insurer is an expert entity regarding risk distribu-
tion and actuarial figures. The insurer can be
expected to cover things that can be profitably
covered and avoid promising to cover things that
will lead to insolvency (e.g., nuclear war). On the
other hand, the insurer may not have made the
policy's limitations clear, may miscalculate, or may
attempt to take advantage of a particular policy-
holder or class of policyholders to improve its bot-
tom line or salve a bad underwriting year. In
these cases, courts must exercise sound judgment
to render a decision that makes the policy do what
it was intended to do even if the parties now dis-
pute that intent. In these instances, courts occa-
sionally find or exclude coverage even if the most
natural reading of the text of the policy is to the
contrary.
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Special Aspects of Third-Party Claims
Insurance disputes in first-party cases tend to
be relatively straightforward; the battle lines are
drawn with reasonable clarity. For example, the
policyholder-a homeowner-wants to obtain cov-
erage for damage caused by a botched fuel oil
delivery, and the insurer resists, citing a policy
provision that excludes pollution coverage. In con-
trast, third-party liability insurance raises addi-
tional issues. The insurer may be obligated to rep-
resent the policyholder, and the lawyer selected
must be sensitive to possible conflicts of interest
between the insurer and the policyholder.
The general rule, usually stated in the policy, is
that the liability insurer selects and provides
counsel of its choice. However, if the insurer's posi-
tion conflicts with that of the policyholder, the pol-
icyholder may be able to insist on obtaining a
lawyer of his or her choice. In addition, the policy-
holder may be able to override the policy provi-
sions in some instances or may successfully object
to the insurer's lawyer on grounds that the person
lacks qualifications. Thus, an insurer who assigns
a newly minted (but cheap) law school graduate to
defend a commercial policyholder in a multistate
pollution matter may have opened the door to
judicial limitation on the insurer's right to select
counsel.
Duty to Defend. All of these possible problems
(which lie beyond the scope of this Law Note)
arise because the third-party liability policy cre-
ates a duty to defend.'' In other words, the policy
is for litigation insurance as well as loss insur-
ance. To determine whether the duty to defend
has been triggered, courts look at the face of the
complaint or, in certain circumstances, the
demand letter or other evidence of a serious claim
against the policyholder.
For purposes of determining the duty to defend,
the allegations are assumed to be true, even if the
insurer has evidence to the contrary. if the stated
claim comes within the scope of policy coverage,
the insurer must provide a defense."' If the insur-
er can demonstrate the inaccuracy of the allega-
tions, it ordinarily should commence a declaratory
judgment action seeking a judicial determination
that it need not defend the claim.
In many states, the penalty for breaching the
duty to defend is that the insurer must pick up
the tab (even if it exceeds the policy limits) for
whatever resolution of the matter ultimately
occurs, even if the insurer could have shown that
the claim was not properly subject to indemnity or
that the amount of the settlement or judgment
was excessive."5 The rules in other states are less
severe but nonetheless punishing to insurers that
fail to defend.
The duty to indemnify is narrower than the
duty to defend 6 and takes hold only if the claim
actually succeeds and falls within the policy. For
example, an insurer may need to defend a bogus
claim of assault and battery when the policyhold-
er was the one assaulted and merely fended off
the claimant. Similarly, a claim mixing negligence
("he carelessly knocked me over") with assault
("he purposely knocked me down") must be
defended. 7 But the insurer will not need to
indemnity if the claimant recovers only on the
assault theory and the policy excluded coverages
for intentional acts or conduct expected or intend-
ed from the standpoint of the policyholder.
Duty to Settle. Related to the duty to defend is
the duty to settle. Suppose the holder of liability
insurance faces a large pending claim that the
insurer can settle within the policy limits for an
amount that is reasonable in relation to the claim.
Most courts will imply a duty to settle.S Failure to
settle can constitute a bad-faith breach of the
insurance policy, which can subject the insurer to
damages. Some states treat bad-faith breach of
the settlement or payment duty as a breach of
Some states treat
bad-faith breach
of settlement
or payment duty
as a breach
of contract
contract."' The majority treat it as an independent
tort; a policyholder who can demonstrate such a
breach is entitled to sue the insurer for punitive
damages."0
Traps for the Unwary
Some issues recur in cases related to insurance
coverage. You can prevent or resolve many prob-
lems by considering these issues when you review
insurance policies.
Intentional Acts. Most insurance policies state
that they do not cover intentionally created losses
or specific losses clearly and concretely expected
by the policyholder. Even if such language were
lacking, many courts would imply this limitation,
because insurance depends on fortuity. A policy
that paid the policyholder for intentional miscon-
duct, reckless behavior, or completely predictable
expenses would undermine the random pooling of
fortuitous risk that is necessary for an insurance
system.
Courts vary in terms of the degree of intent
they require to invoke the exclusion. Some courts
Law Notes
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take the pro-policyholder stance that only a specif-
ic intent to cause the specific loss in question
negates coverage." A smaller number of courts at
the opposite extreme maintain that coverage is
voided by a generalized expectation of the possi-
bility of the loss or some degree of foreseeability
2
The majority of courts take a middle view: Some
policyholder knowledge of the possibility of loss
does not void coverage, but knowledge of a suffi-
cient probability of harm from conduct invokes
the intentional-act exclusion." For example, a
A manufacturer
knowing its product
may pose a danger
may fall under
the intentional-act
exclusion
manufacturer expects it will occasionally be sued
for product liability by at least some disgruntled
customers. This should not be a problem under
the "expected or intended" exclusion. However, if a
manufacturer knows that its product poses a par-
ticular danger, yet markets it without warning, its
behavior may invoke the intentional-act exclusion.
Trigger of Coverage. Normally, determining
when a policy is triggered is easy. For claims-made
policies, the trigger is the making of a covered
claim. For policies that cover an "occurrence," the
trigger is the happening of a covered event. Most
events take place at a set point in time. An auto
accident occurs when the cars collide. A product
liability claim occurs when the product malfunc-
tions, causing injury. A trespass claim occurs
when the property line is breached.
However, for long-latency, more subtle, less visi-
ble and verifiable losses such as asbestos-related
injury, groundwater pollution, or insidious disease,
the time of the event is not discrete and clear.
Courts facing such claims have deemed policies to
be triggered by exposure to offending matter,6
manifestation of adverse symptoms,6" actual
injury-in-fact, 6 and combinations of these, includ-
ing the so-called "continuous trigger""1 that some
courts use for deciding asbestos and product lia-
bility claims.
Allocation of Responsibilities Among Multiple
Insurers. If the trigger of coverage is continuous or
based on injury or exposure taking place over sev-
eral years, the situation may implicate several dif-
ferent policies and insurers. In these cases, courts
often apportion coverage liability among insurers.
The most popular means of doing so are proration
by policy limits;" proration by time on the risk,"9
proration by party,70 and attempted proration by
degree of injury occurring in each policy period 7'
(despite the obvious proof problems with this
approach). 72
An alternative approach is to allow the policy-
holder to allocate covered losses among the applic-
able carriers.7' This approach is often referred to
as joint-and-several liability of insurers. The poli-
cyholder using it is more likely to maximize cover-
age by linking losses with maximum available
insurance, but joint-and-several liability also low-
ers the transaction costs of litigating and deter-
mining apportioned injury.
The proration approaches are simple to apply
and give the policyholder less license to pick and
choose. They may be inequitable, however, as some
policies and policy years may have only a tangen-
tial link to the losses and may have been written
under different assumptions than the court is
using.
Complexities AboundIssues related to insurance coverage can be
complex, particularly when the dispute involves
several entities and years of coverage or large
numbers of claimants with long-latency injuries.
However, by applying the right mix of insurance
law, contract doctrine, and a dose of common
sense, you can successfully resolve most of these
disputes.
NOTES
1. See Red Panther Chem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of Pa.,
43 F.3d 514, 517 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying Mississippi
law); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467
(Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1060 (1987); Standard
Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co, 503 Pa.
300,469 A.2d 563 (1983).
2. E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, Chs. 2, 3 (2d ed.
1990).
3. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Interpretation of Insurance Con-
tracts: Law and Strategy for Insurers and Policyholders
§§ 6.6-6.9 (1994).
4. This seemingly simple aspect of an insurance con-
troversy can become problematic if the policyholder
does not keep good records long enough. Although the
insurer's files are subject to discovery, they occasionally
do not contain the relevant policies. In a well-known
case concerning asbestos coverage (Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980) (applying Illinois and New Jersey law)), the man-
ufacturer suggested that it might have had coverage for
some of the years at issue but could not locate policies
to prove coverage. In the absence of policies or evidence
su icient to establish the existence and content of poli-
cies, the court found the manufacturer uninsured for
those years. Consequently, the manufacturer's responsi-
bility for the losses was prorated with that of the insur-
ers over the three decades during which the policyhold-
er's product allegedly caused damage by an
"occurrence."
5. See Farnsworth, supra note 2, Ch. 5.
6. See Stempel, supra note 3, § 1.4.
7. See, e.g., New England Mut. Life Irs. Co. v. Null,
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605 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying Missouri law
where a grossly inflated life insurance policy was pur-
chased on a business associate who was killed); Ruben-
stein v. Mutual Lift, Iris. Co. of NY, 584 F. Supp. 272
(E.D. La. 1984) (applying Louisiana law where a grossly
inflated life insurance policy was purchased on a low-
level employee who was killed).
8. See National Fidelity Life Irs. Co. v. Karaganis,
811 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying Illinois law); IBM
Poughkeepsie Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis
Ins. Co. Inc., 590 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (New York
law); Stempel, supra note 3, § 3.4.
9. See Farnsworth, supra note 2, § 7.11.
10. See id. §§ 7.8-7.14.
11. See Red Panther Chem. Co., 43 F.3d at 517.
12. See Gianni v. R. Russel & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A.
791 (1924); Farnsworth, supra note 2, § 7.2.
13. See, e.g., Emplojers Casualty Co. v. Northivestern
Nat7 Iris. Group, 109 Cal. App. 3d 462, 471, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 296 (1980).
14. See, e.g., Berg v. Hudesman, 115 Wash. 2d 657,
801 P.2d 222 (1990).
15. See Stempel, sit pra note 3, § 3.5.
16. See Farnsworth, supra note 2, § 7.11; Stempel,
supra note 3, §§ 5.1-5.9.
17. See Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Batk,
910 F2d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying North Car-
olina and Virginia law); Stempel, supra note 3, Ch. 4.
Contracts may ordinarily be rescinded on grounds of
mistake, impossibility, commercial impracticability, and
frustration of purpose as well as fraud. These contract
doctrines apply to insurance but rarely become the sub-
ject of controversy. More commonly, insurance litigation
focuses on insurer efforts to avoid coverage on the basis
of specific recision grounds set forth in the policy, such
as nonpayment of premiums, failure to cooperate, fail-
ure to give notice, concealment, or fraud and misrepre-
sentation.
18. See Putnam Resources v. Patenian, 958 F.2d 448
(1st Cir. 1992) (applying Rhode Island law); Stempel,
supra note 3, §§ 14.1-14.3.
19. See, e.g., Lykos v. Anerican Home Irs. Co., 609
F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079
(1980) (applying Illinois law); Stempel, supra note 3, §
31.7.
20. See Farnsworth, supra note 2, §§ 4.1-5.9; Stem-
pel, supra note 3, Ch. 7.
21. See L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d
57, 60 (6th Cir. 1968) (applying Ohio law and finding
"the violation of public pol icy is measured by the ten-
dency of the contract to injure the public good rather
than by actual injury under the particular circum-
stances").
22. See Stempel, supra note 3, § 7.3.
23. See Robert G. Schloerb et al., Punitive Damages:
A Guide to the Insurability of Punitive Damages in the
United States and Its Territories 38-41 (1988).
24. See, e.g., St. Paul Iris. Co. v. Talladega Nursing
Home, Iris., 606 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying
Alabama law).
25. See, e.g., Lazenby v. Universal Underiwriters Iris.
Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
26. See Stempel, supra note 3, § 7.3.
27. See id., Ch. 2 (Contract Formation).
28. See id. § 2.5.
29. See id. § 3.5.
30. On the sophisticated policyholder defense and
the impact of policyholder identity on coverage ques-
tions, see id., Ch. 24.
31. See, e.g., Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Potter, 330
N.W.2d 263, 265 (Iowa 1983).
32. New Castle Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indent.
Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1193 (applying Delaware law).
33. See, e.g., Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Sir. Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980)
(applying Pennsylvania law and holding court should
not "torture" the policy language to find an ambiguity);
Connick v. "1'achers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 784 E2d 1018
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 822 (1986) (California
law). See Steinpel, supra note 3, Ch. 5.
34. This is because the insurance system will not
work unless losses are "fortuitous"-that is, by chance
rather than expected, intended, or planned by policy-
holders seeking to fob off their problems on society at
large through the process of risk spreading through
insurance. See Stempel, supra note 3, § 1.5.
35. See, e.g., A.Y McDonald Ind. v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 842 F. Supp. 1166, 1170 (N.D. Ia. 1993) (applying
Iowa law and holding, "Because insurance policies are
in the nature of adhesive contracts, we construe their
provisions in a light favorable to the insured").
36. See, e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty
Mit. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D.N.Y 1983), modi-
fied on other grounds, 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1984); Darn-
er Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.,
140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388 (1984); Continental Ins. Co.
v. Paccai; Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 160, 634 P.2d 291 (1981).
37. See, e.g., Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank
Corp., 922 FE21 357, 366 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Illi-
nois law and holding, "If an insurance contract is
ambiguous either party should be allowed to introduce
evidence to disambiguate it. But if, all such evidence
having been considered, the meaning of the contract is
still uncertain, then the insured wins. In other words,
the interpretative principle (favor the insured) is mere-
ly a tie-breaker").
38. See George Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d §
79:315 at 255 (Rhodes rev. ed. 1983).
39. See Farnsworth, supra note 2, at §§ 8.2, 8.3.
40. Id. at § 8.2. Because of the histo- ical confusion
attending the terms, the Restatement (jecond) refers
simply to "conditions" to describe conditions p; cedent.
'd. at 569.
41. See, e.g., Kalell v. Mutual Fire & Auto Ins. Co., 471
N.W.2d 865, 867 (Iowa 1991).
42. See, e.g., Neiw Castle Co. v. Hartford Accid -it &
Indemn. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1181-82 (3d Cir. 1991)
(applyingDelaware law); Branmer v. Allied Mut. Iris.
Co., 182 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1970). But see Northern
Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assocs., inc., 942 F.2d 189, 195 (3d
Cir. 1991) (applying Pennsylvania law and placing bur-
den on policyholder to show that its pollution-an
exclusion-was not subject to the exclusion because it
was "sudden and accidental"-an exception).
43. See New Castle Co. v. Hartford Accident and
Indem. Co., 933 F.2d at 1181; US. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Morrison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437, 443 (D. Kan.
1990) (applying Kansas law).
44. See generally Stempel, supra note 3, § 31.3.
45. See id. § 31.4. See, e.g., Weaver Bros., Inc. v. Chap-
pel, 684 P.2d 123 (Alaska 1984) (late notice six years
after loss no bar to coverage because insurer could not
demonstrate prejudice).
46. See, e.g., Cooper v. Government Ins. Co., 51 N.J.
86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968) (insurer must show appreciable
prejudice to prevail on late notice defense).
47. See, e.g., Jennings v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co.,
549 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (10th Cir, 1977) (applying Col-
orado law); Gerrard Realty Corp. v. American States Ins.
Co., 89 Wis. 2d 130, 277 N.W.2d 863 (1979).
48. See Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., Inc. v. North River Ins.
Co., 79 N.Y.2d 576, 594 N.E.2d 571, 584 N.Y.S.2d 290
(1992) (primary insurer need only show late notice to
avoid coverage, but reinsurer must show prejudice
when complaining about primary insurer's allegedly
late notice).
49. See, e.g., Jefferson -Pilot Fire & Cas. Co. v. Boothe,
Prichard & Dudley, 638 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1980) (apply-
ing Virginia law)- Avres v. Harlcysville Miut. Cas. Co.,
172 Va. 383, 2 S.E.2d 303 (1939).
50. Robert E. Keeton, "Insurance Law Rights at Vari-
ance with Policy Provisions," 83 Hlarv. L. Rev. 961 (Part
1) (1970) and 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (Part I) (1970).
51. See Stempel, supra note 3, § 11.1; Barry R.
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Ostrager & Thomas R. Newman, Handbook of Insur-
ance Coverage Disputes § 1.03 (7th ed. 1994).
52. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Su: Co.,
667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1007 (1982) (applying reasonable expectations approach
where policyholder was large commercial entity to ques-
tion of when asbestos injury "occurs" within the mean-
ing of the policy); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. John J Bor-
dlee Constr., 543 F. Supp. 597, 602 (E.D. La. 1982)
(reasonable expectations "apt when the insured is an
innocent and naive party unfamiliar with the insurance
field").
53. See Stempel, supra note 3, § 31.10.
54. See, e.g., First S. Ins. Co. v. Jim Lynch Enter., Inc.,
932 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Missouri law).
55. See, e.g., Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Inden.
Co., 638 F. Supp. 1179 (W.D. Pa. 1986), appeal
dismissed, 815 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying Penn-
sylvania law).
56. See John Deere Ins. v. Shanrock Ind., 929 F.2d
413,417 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Minnesota law).
57. See, e.g., Perkins v. Hartford Ins. Group, 932 F.2d
1392, 1395 (1 th Cir 1991) (applying Alabama law). See
Stempel, supra note 3, § 11.10.2.
58. See Stempel, supra note 3, § 31.11.
59. See, e.g., Beck v. Fariner's Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795
(Utah 1985).
60. See, e.g., Eureka Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Ameri-
can Casualty Co., 873 l,2d 229 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying
California law). Other states permit an award of puni-
tive damages only if the tort of bad-faith breach is
accompanied by an indendent tort (e.g., fraud) that
would itself support an award of punitive damages. See,
e.g., Lissinan v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 50, (4th
Cir. 1988) (applying Virginia law). See generally Stem-
pel, supra note 3, C h. 19.
61. See, e.g., Talley v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Ark.
269, 620 S.W2d 260 (1981). See Steiipel, supra note 3, §
24.2.4.
62. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Co. v Vagnozzi, 138 Ariz.
'143, 675 P.2d 703 (1983). See Stempel, supra note 3, §
24.2.1.
63. See, e.g., Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d
703, 278 N.W.2d 898 (1979). See Stempel, supra note 3,
§ 24.2.2.
64. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying
Illinois and New Jersey law).
65. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co,, 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1028 (1983) (applying Illinois and Ohio law). This
is the same Illinois law that led to use of the exposure
trigger in the 6th Circuit decision cited in the previous
note. Ultimately, the real Illinois courts adopted a dou-
ble trigger, ruling that either exposure or manifestation
invoked the policy. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Rayrnark
Indus., 118 Ill. 2d 23, 514 N.E.2d 150 (1987).
66. See, e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760 (2d Cir 1984) (applying New
York law).
67. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Su,: Co., 667
F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (applying essentially generic
or universal law).
68. See, e.g., National Indem. Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Cos.,
150 Ariz. 458, 724 P. 2d 544 (1985).
69. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1984).
70. See, e.g., Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754
(3d Cir. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania law).
71. See, e.g., Uniroyal, Iic. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F.
Supp. 1388 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying New Yurk law).
72. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois Mfg. Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Su: Co., 138 N.J. 437, 650 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1994) (embrac-
ing proration by limits as a basic guide but insisting
that trial court on remand appoint a master and
attempt to allocate losses among carriers according to
actual injury determinable by modeling if particular-
ized proof unavailable).
73. See, e.g., Keene Corp., 667 F.2d 1034.
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